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INTRODUCTION

A. The Advent of Major Vessel-Source Pollution
On March 16, 1978, history's worst oil spill occurred when the
tanker Amoco Cadiz lost her steering and drifted onto rocky
shoals off the French coast.1 Approximately 223,000 tons of oil
were spilled,2 polluting and ruining over 100 miles of the Brittany
coast, an area that previously had supplied one-third of France's
seafood 3 and had attracted tourists from all over Europe. Despite
all this damage, only thirty million dollars was available for
cleanup4-none to repair the ecological devastation. Although this
well-publicized accident shocked the world, it was only one of
many oil spills that occurred during 1978.
By definition, "vessel-source pollution" not only refers to oil
pollution from accidents at sea such as that of the Amoco Cadiz,
it also encompasses pollution from several other sources. Vesselsource pollution includes any type of pollution originating from
vessels engaged in navigation or transportation, as distinguished
1. Grove, Black Day for Brittany, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July 1978, at 124, 124.
For additional information relating to the problems and associated costs of vessel-source oil pollution, see H. BURMESTER, VESSEL SOURCE POLLUTION: THE INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESPONSES IN THE SEARCH FOR AN
EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1 (Center for Oceans Law & Pol'y, June 1978);

Hunter, Possibilitiesand Problems of PreventingOil Pollutionof the Oceans, 4
TRANS. L.J. 21 (1972); Newman, Oil on Troubled Waters: The International
Control of Marine Pollution, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 349 (1971); Wood, An Integrated International and Domestic Approach to Civil Liability for VesselSource Oil Pollution,7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1975). For an overview of international law relating to pollution, see J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (1974).

2. See Grove, supra note 1, at 124. Approximately 42 gallons (U.S.) of oil are
contained in a barrel, and approximately 7.4 barrels constitute a ton of oil.
Thus, one ton of oil is equivalent to about 311 gallons (U.S.).
3. Id. at 132.
4. Carter, Amoco Cadiz Incident Points Up the Elusive Goal of Tanker
Safety, 200 Sc. 514, 514 (1978). Cleanup costs approached 70 million dollars.
Keerdoja & Mitchelmore, Brittany's Black Tide, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1978, at
11.
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from pollutants that are discharged from ships engaged in ocean
dumping. These international operational discharges, which include reballasting and tank cleaning, constitute approximately
eighty percent of the world's vessel-source oil pollution.5 Even
pollution from vessels mining the deep seabed can and should be
categorized and regulated as vessel-source pollution, Toxic chemicals,' liquefied natural gas (LNG),J and other hazardous materials
are additional examples of potential pollutants that should be
regulated by vessel-source pollution legislation.
Although various pollutants are subsumed within the category
of vessel-source pollution, domestic and international provisions
concerning vessel-source pollution have focused primarily on discharges and accidents involving oil." This Article, therefore, will
examine vessel-source pollution from the perspective of oil
pollution.
B.

International Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution

International vessel-source pollution is basically regulated by
two major international agreements: the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954
(1954 Oil Convention),9 and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973).1o Both of

5. Moore, Protection of Navigational Freedom and the Problem of VesselSource Pollution, NEw TRENDS IN M ARTMmE NAVIGATION 1979: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL OCEANS SYMPOSIUM 39, 40 (Ocean Assoc. of Japan, 1979).
6.

Id. at 39-40.

7.

See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: SAFETY, SITING, AND POLICY CON-

CERNS 33-38 (Comm. Print 1978).
8. For a recent compilation of articles dealing with vessel-source oil pollution, see Brown, Marine Oil PollutionLiterature:An Annotated Bibliography,
13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 373 (1982).
9. Opened for signatureMay 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327

U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United States Dec. 8, 1961, subject to an
understanding, reservations, and a recommendation), amended Apr. 7, 1962, 17
U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 322 (entered into force in the
United States May 18 & June 28, 1967), amended Oct. 21, 1969, 28 U.S.T. 1205,

T.I.A.S. No. 8505, (not yet available in U.N.T.S.) (entered into force in the
United States Jan. 20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Oil Convention].
10. I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in 12 I.L.M.
1319 (1973). For a discussion of the effect of this convention, see Note, The 1973
IMCO Convention: Tightening the Controls on OperationalOil Pollutionfrom
Tankers, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 353 (1976).
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these agreements were drafted at conferences sponsored by the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)."
IMCO was organized in 1948 pursuant to provisions of the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO Convention), 2 but did not begin to function until
1958, when the IMCO Convention entered into force. The chief
concerns of IMCO were to encourage the development of uniform
international maritime pollution regulations and to foster intergovernmental cooperation regarding various aspects of maritime
commerce. 13
The 1954 Oil Convention, entered into force internationally in
1958, was subsequently amended twice. The amendments entered
into force in 1967 and 1978, respectively. In 1971 IMCO adopted
a third amendment to the 1954 Oil Convention prescribing standards for tank size and design, 4 but this amendment has never
been ratified. The need for this amendment, however, has been
alleviated by the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS '74)15 and its 1978 Protocol, 6 both of which
have been ratified by the United States."
Although the United States initiated MARPOL 1973 through
11. For an excellent brief discussion of the historical developments of the
1954 Oil Convention, MARPOL 1973, and their corresponding amendments, see
Cycon, Calming Troubled Waters: The Developing International Regime to
Control OperationalPollution, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35, 37-44 (1981). In 1979
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization changed its official
name to the International Maritime Organization, but is still commonly referred
to as IMCO.
12. Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (entered
into force in the United States Mar. 17, 1958, subject to an understanding and a
reservation).
13. Meese, When JurisdictionalInterests Collide: International,Domestic,
and State Efforts to Prevent Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 12 OcAN DEV. &
INT'L L.J. 71, 115 n.85 (1982).
14. I.M.C.O. Doc. A VII/Res. 246 (Nov. 3, 1971), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 267
(1972).
15. Done Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700 (not yet available in
U.N.T.S.) (entered into force in the United States May 25, 1980).
16. Done Feb. 17, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 10,009 (not yet available in U.S.T. and
U.N.T.S.) (entered into force in the United States May 1, 1981). The 1978 SOLAS Protocol, as well as the 1978 MARPOL Protocol, are "largely devoted to
technical changes relating to the construction and equipment of tankers, [and
are] designed to improve their safety." Popp, Recent Developments in Tanker
Control in InternationalLaw, 18 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 20 (1980).
17. 126 CONG. REC. S9263-72 (daily ed. July 2, 1980).
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IMCO,' s the United States did not ratify the Convention until
the summer of 1980 when, by ratifying a protocol to MARPOL
1973 which was adopted by IMCO in 1978, the MARPOL 1973
Convention was also ratified.1 Neither MARPOL 1973 nor the
1978 Protocol has entered into force internationally. 0 When they
do, however, they will supersede the 1954 Oil Convention provisions among ratifying countries. 2 '
Three major agreements govern international liability for vessel-source pollution: (1) the Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention),22 (2) the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (Brussels Liability Convention),2 3 and (3) the
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention).24
These liability agreements were the result of a reexamination of
the traditional precepts of international law regarding rights of
intervention and compensation that evolved after the 1967 Torrey
Canyon accident.2 5 It is important to note that the United States

is a party only to the Intervention Convention. As of 1983, the
United States Senate still had not ratified the other two conven26
tions, ostensibly because the limits on recovery were too low.
18.
TIONAL

See R. M'GONIGLE & M.

ZACHER,

POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNA-

LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 107-09 (1979) [hereinafter cited as M'GONIGLE].

19. 126 CONG. REC. S9263-72 (daily ed. July 2, 1980).
20. M'GONIGLE, supra note 18, at 315-16.
21. Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollutionby Ocean Vessels-An Environmental
Tragedy: The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, MultilateralConventions,
and Coastal States, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 37, 68 (1980).
22. Done Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068 (not yet available in
U.N.T.S.) (entered into force in the United States May 6, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Intervention Convention].
23. Done Nov. 29, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Brussels Liability Convention],
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970).
24. Done Dec. 18, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Fund Convention], reprinted in
11 I.L.M. 284 (1972).
25. See E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); C.
GILL, F. BooKER & T. SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON (1967);
Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J.
400 (1967). For a description of the parties involved, see infra note 144.
26. See Richardson, Prevention of Vessel-Source Pollution (Part II: Compensation, Monitoring and Enforcement), OCEANS, May-June 1980, at 58, 59. See

generally Note, Liability for High Seas Oil Pollution Cleanup Costs: Domestic
and InternationalProvisions,3 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 473 (1980) (discussing differences in amounts and types of recovery available under the Brus-
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The Brussels Liability Convention provided for a maximum liability limit of 210 million francs (approximately eighteen and onehalf million dollars)2 7 while the Fund Convention's liability limit
was established between 900 and 1,110 million francs (sixty-two
million dollars and seventy-nine million dollars respectively).28
Owners of oil tankers have supplemented the three major international liability agreements with two voluntary agreements of
their own: (1) the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), 29 and (2) the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution (CRISTAL).30 TOVALOP, which now applies to
ninety-nine percent of the total world tanker tonnage,"1 compensates national governments up to ten million dollars for cleanup
costs from oil spills that were the result of tanker negligence.3 2
CRISTAL increases the compensation limit to thirty million dollars and covers governmental costs, damages to private parties,
and certain types of environmental damage resulting from oil
spills.33 Both TOVALOP and CRISTAL are "intended to be temporary measures, pending the entry into force of the IMCO conventions.

' 34

When the Fund Convention enters into force, CRIS-

TAL will expire.3 5
Naturally, all of these international conventions fall under the
penumbra of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention).3 6 Although the LOS Convention governs the general international obligations relating to vessel-source pollution, the
eels Liability Convention, supra note 23, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, infra note 49, as amended by the Clean Water

Act of 1977, infra note 45).
27. Brussels Liability Convention, supra note 23, art. V; Richardson, supra

note 26, at 58.
28. Fund Convention, supra note 24, arts. IV-V; Richardson, supra note 26,

at 59.
29. Jan. 7, 1969 [hereinafter cited as TOVALOP], reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 497

(1969).
30. Jan. 14, 1971 [hereinafter cited as CRISTAL], reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 137

(1971).
31. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 21, at 69-70.

32. TOVALOP, supra note 29, arts. IV, VI.
33. CRISTAL, supra note 30, arts. I, IV.
34. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 21, at 70.

35. CRISTAL, supra note 30, art. I(C)(1).
36. Done Dec. 10, 1982 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 [hereinafter cited as LOS
Convention], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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practical aspects of vessel-source pollution clearly are to be governed by the international standards supplied by IMCO.
C. United States Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution
In 1961 Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),3 7 which
implemented the 1954 Of Convention. 8 Congress ratified the
1969 and 1971 amendments to the 1954 Oil Convention in a 1973
OPA amendment.3 9 Similarly, by enacting the Intervention on the
41
High Seas Act,40 Congress ratified the Intervention Convention.
The first vessel-source legislation directed at protecting the
marine environment was the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972 (PWSA).42 The PWSA was amended in 1978 by the Port
and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (PTSA)4 3 to strengthen United
States control over vessels operating near its coastlines, to ensure
that those vessels were operated by more qualified crews, and to
improve the construction and operation standards of tankers.
The Clean Water Act of 1977,4 5 which erroneously46 extended
United States jurisdiction over sources of pollution out to twohundred miles from the nation's coastline, was based on three
earlier acts: (1) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1948; 4 7 (2) the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970;41 and (3)
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

(FWPCAA).

49

37. Pub. L. No. 87-167, 75 Stat. 402 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1001-1016 (1982)).

38. 1954 Oil Convention, supra note 9.
39. Oil Pollution Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-119, 87 Stat. 424
(codified in scattered sections at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1016 (1982)).
40. Pub. L. No. 93-248, 88 Stat. 8 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-

1487 (1982)).
41. Intervention Convention, supra note 22.

42. Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1221-1236, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1976)).

43. Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (codified in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C. and 46 U.S.C. §§ 214, 391 (1982)).

44. See H.R. REP. No. 1384, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS 3270.

45. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Clean Water Act].
46.
47.
48.
(1982).
49.

See infra text accompanying notes 57-62.
Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
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The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (Environmental Response Act), 50 which.
consolidated two House bills, H.R. 7020 and H.R. 85,51 was the
major United States legislation governing liability and compensation for vessel-source pollution in the early 1980s. H.R. 7020 dealt
with the discovery of inactive hazardous waste dumping sites such
as the Love Canal in New York, while H.R. 85 was the expanded
version of President Carter's "superfund" proposal for oil
pollution.52
The Environmental Response Act placed liability on vessel
owners for the costs of removal, remedial action, and any injury
to natural resources caused by spills of oil or other hazardous
waste, limited to the greater of five million dollars or three hundred dollars per gross ton.5 3 The Environmental Response Act
also established a fund to compensate victims of the pollution
and to cover costs that could not be recovered from the vessel
owners.5 4 The Act established jurisdiction over the "navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean waters of
which the natural resources are under the exclusive management
authority of the United States under the Fishery Convention and
Management Act 55 of 1976. ''15 The jurisdictional provisions of the
Environmental Response Act confirmed the controversial twohundred mile extension of United States jurisdiction over discharges of oil and hazardous substances, as first enunciated in the
Clean Water Act of 1977. 5 The unilateral extension of jurisdiction in the Clean Water Act of 1977 was protested by most of the
United States NATO allies.58 Apparently, Senate staff members

(1982)).

50. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 26, 33, 42, 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Environmental
Response Act].
51. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1979).
52. See 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119. The comparable Senate
bills were S. 1480 and S. 1341.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1982).

54. See id. § 9631(c)(1).
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982) (footnote added).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8)(A) (1982).
57. Supra note 45.
58. Moore, How Not to Protect Our Oceans, Newsday, July 10, 1978, at 42,
col. 2; see Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Expanded Competence over
Vessel-Source Pollution, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 289, 318-20 (1978).

19841
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concerned about the Argo Merchant oil spill5 9 "had inserted with-

out fair discussion a little noticed technical provision in the important and veto-proof Clean Water Act."60 When President
Carter signed the bill, he indicated his hope that Congress and
the Administration would make the Clean Water Act adhere to
international law. 1 The Carter Administration did not, however,
notice the jurisdictional provision until after the Act had passed.
Thereafter, Congress apparently approved this unilateral twohundred mile extension of jurisdiction by passing the Environ2
mental Response Act in its entirety.

Although the Environmental Response Act and the FWPCAA
constitute the major United States legislation on vessel-source
pollution, three related laws also govern marine pollution in certain specialized circumstances: (1) the Deepwater Port Act,6 3 (2)

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 1978 Amendments,64 and (3) the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.6 5
The OCSLA 1978 Amendments directly affected vessel-source
pollution by initiating a major environmental safeguard, the Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund. Congress intended the
size of the fund to remain between one hundred million dollars
and two hundred million dollars, 7 financed by a fee of no more
than three cents levied on each barrel of Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) oil produced. 8
The OCSLA 1978 Amendments defined oil pollution as:
(B) the presence of oil in or on the waters of the high seas outside
the territorial limits of the United States(i) when discharged in connection with activities conducted
59. The Argo Merchant, a Liberian tanker, grounded itself on the shoals off
of Nantucket Island on December 15, 1976. The resulting oil spill was the tenth
largest in history.
60. Moore, supra note 58, at 42, col. 2.
61. Id.
62. It should be noted that criticism of the provision extending jurisdiction
has resulted in a conservative interpretation by the EPA in enforcing the act.
"The EPA now limits its enforcement to ships in port." Meese, supra note 13, at
88.
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982).
64. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95372, 92 Stat. 629 (codified in scattered sections of titles 16, 30, 43 U.S.C.) (1982).

65. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1982).
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1812 (1982).
67. Id. § 1812(a), (d)(2).
68. Id. § 1812(d)(1).
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under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et.
seq.); or
(ii) causing injury to or loss of natural resources belonging to,
appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of,
the United States; or
(C) the presence of oil in or on the territorial sea, navigable or internal waters, or adjacent shoreline of a foreign country, in a case
where damages are recoverable by a foreign claimant under this
subchapter ... 69
This definition appears to cover oil pollution resulting from both
OCS development and vessels. Ostensibly, vessel-source oil pollution is included under the definition: "the presence of oil in or on
the waters of the high seas outside the territorial limits of the
United States . . .[which causes] injury to or loss of natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of, the United States .
,,7o Under this statutory language, the United States delimits all areas beyond its
three-mile territorial sea as high seas, including the contiguous
zone that extends a maximum of twelve miles beyond the territorial sea.7 '
Under section 1813(a) of the OCSLA 1978 Amendments, the
following claims may be asserted for economic loss resulting from
oil pollution:
(1) removal costs; and
(2) damages, including(A) injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property;,
(B) loss of use of real or personal property;
(C) injury to, or destruction of, natural resources;
(D) loss of use of natural resources;
(E) loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property or natural resources; and
(F) loss of tax revenue for a period of one year due to injury to
72
real or personal property.
As a general rule, any United States claimant or governmental
entity may recover as an injured party.73 Claims for injuries to
69. Id. § 1811(9).
70. Id. § 1811(9)(B), 1811(9)(B)(ii).

71. See LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 3, 33.
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a).
73. Id. § 1813(b).
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natural resources, however, may only be asserted by states, as
trustees for natural resources within their boundaries, or by the
President, as trustee for natural resources managed by the Federal Government.7"
Section 1814(a) imposes strict liability on offshore OCS developers and vessel-source polluters, but not on public vessels.7 5 Liability is limited to 35 million dollars for the owner or operator of
offshore facilities, 78 and to the greater of 250 thousand dollars or
300 dollars per gross ton for vessel-source polluters.7 These limits
on liability do not apply to oil pollution caused by: (1) willful misconduct; (2) gross negligence; (3) violations of which the owner or
operator is aware of "applicable safety, construction, or operating
standards or regulations;17 or (4) in the case of vessel-source pol-

luters only, failure to "provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested. ' 7 9 Accordingly, the United States asserts jurisdiction only over vessel-source polluters who are within the
two-hundred mile limit of the economic zone, which is consistent
with articles 211, 220, and 221 of the LOS Convention. 0 If, however, a vessel creates an environmental hazard beyond the twohundred mile limit that threatens harm to the area within its economic zone, the OCSLA 1978 Amendments conceivably could assert greater coastal state jurisdiction than is permitted under the
1
8

LOS Convention.

The United States exercise of jurisdiction over pollution within
the two-hundred mile zone could be an inordinate exercise of
coastal-state power. Under article 211 of the LOS Convention,
two basic conditions must be met before a coastal state may regulate vessel-source pollution within its economic zone. First, a
coastal state may regulate vessel-source pollution within two-hun74. Id. § 1813(b)(3).
75. Id. § 1814(a). The exemption of "public vessels" from the provisions of
section 1814 is consistent with article 236 of the LOS Convention, which grants
sovereign immunity to public vessels. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 236.
These vessels are still required to protect the marine environment "so far as is
reasonable and practicable." Id.
76. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(b)(2).
77. Id. § 1814(b)(1).
78. Id. § 1814(b).
79. Id. § 1814(b)(1).
80. See 43 U.S.C. § 1813 (concerning permissible claims and persons entitled
to seek relief).
81. See LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 211, 220-21.
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dred miles of its coast only if its regulations conform to and give
effect to the "generally accepted international rules and standards" 2 promulgated by the appropriate "international organization," specifically IMCO. 8 3 Second, coastal-state regulation under
article 211 can occur only when the regulation does not hinder the
innocent passage of foreign vessels.8 4 Even so, article 220 provides
for coastal-state jurisdiction where:
there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the
exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the
exclusive economic zone, committed a violation of applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels ... that State may require the vessel
85
to give information ... [relating to the alleged violation].
The LOS Convention clearly intends to maintain maximum
navigational freedom for vessels,"' while restricting coastal-state
jurisdiction over vessels in the economic zone to those events involving major pollution damage, 7 maritime casualties, or the
threat thereof.8 8 If a "substantial discharge causing or threatening
significant pollution of the marine environment" occurs, the
coastal state is allowed to inspect the vessel.8 9 If vessel-source
pollution threatens the state's coastline, the vessel may be detained.9 0 A conflict clearly exists between the LOS Convention
and the "high seas" delimitation of section 1811(9) of the OCSLA
1978 Amendments."1 The United States, therefore, may be operating outside the scope of the LOS Convention because (1) the
United States has unilaterally extended its pollution jurisdiction
seaward to two-hundred miles in many areas, and (2) the United
States has only an average record of incorporating IMCO standards into its legislation.
82. Id. art. 211, para. 2.
83. Id.
84. Id. art. 211, para. 4.
85. Id. art. 220 para. 3. These standards would necessarily be established by
IMCO.
86. See id. para. 7.
87. Id. para. 6.
88. Id. art. 221.
89. Id. art. 220, para. 5.
90. Id. para. 6.
91. Compare text accompanying supra notes 69-71 with text accompanying
supra notes 82-90 (the language of the OCSLA 1978 Amendments is more re-

strictive than and fails to follow the guidelines of the LOS Convention).
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II.

VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION

A. Problems and Goals
Petroleum products are considered to be the most widespread
marine pollutants. 92 According to experts, as much as ten million
tons of oil enter the sea every year. 93 The seriousness of the quantity of oil released into the sea is compounded by the chemical
structure of crude oil; it is one of the most complex natural mixtures on earth. 94 This chemical complexity creates difficulties in
determining all of the detrimental effects on the marine environment. In addition, the severity of an oil spill's toxicity varies according to the physical form in which the oil is being transported.
These physical forms range from crude oil to residual refined oils
to refined light distillates.95
Although few definitive studies have been conducted evaluating
oil's effect on marine ecosystems, evidence exists that illustrates
the detrimental long-term effects of oil pollution on the marine
environment.96 In an oil spill, some of the oil floats, creating a
slick which can coat birds and animals, as well as affecting the
interaction of the water and the air. When the oil dissolves, the
water becomes toxic and its oxygen coitent is reduced, resulting
in the eventual death of many organisms. Oil that sinks to the
bottom of the ocean destroys the benthos. 7 The variety of these
reactions compounds the difficulty of determining the total effect
oil has on the marine environment. Even though research has
been progressing for ten to fifteen years, this research may continue for decades before the effects of oil pollution are fully
understood.98
The most publicized sources of oil pollution are dramatic
tanker accidents which occur near populated coasts; tanker acci92. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 1977 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 211 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SPILL CONFERENCE].
93. Mostert, The Age of the Oilberg, AUDUBON, May 1975, at 18, 25. The
most precise estimate, that of the National Academy of Sciences, places the
figure at 6.1 million tons. Id.
94. Id. at 27.
95. Meese, supra note 13, at 75-76.

96. See id. at 77-79.
97. Benthos are organisms that live on or in the ocean bottom.
98.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, PETROLEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

94 (1975).
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dents, however, occur practically every week. The United States
Congressional Office of Technological Assessment reported over
500 tanker accidents involving oil spills from 1969 to 1974.99 Because many oil spills occur far from inhabited areas, their significance is often ignored. For example, in 1974 the tanker Metula
ran aground, causing a large oil spill in the Strait of Magellan
near the southern tip of South America, 00 but due to the remote
situs of the accident, nothing was done to clean up the spill. 101
Approximately eighty percent of all oil spills occur within ten
miles of shore, seventy-five percent within twenty-five miles of a
port, and eighty-five percent within reach of a coastal recreation
area. 10 2 Because most marine life thrives in the coastal environ-

ment, the majority of oil spills are particularly damaging.
The advent of the supertankers magnified the possibility of catastrophic oil pollution.10 3 Supertankers rose to prominence after
the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967.104 In the late 1970s, supertankers accounted for approximately forty percent of all ocean
traffic. 10 5 Some 433 of those supertankers weighed equal to or
greater than 100,000 deadweight tons (dwt.).106 These "very large
crude carriers" (VLCCs) have been referred to as "oilbergs" because a high proportion of the ship is submerged. The VLCC's
typical depth below water or draft is approximately ninety feet,
twice the depth of many ports, making it much more perilous for
a VLCC to come near shore. The length of the VLCCs (over 1,000
feet) and their tremendous bulk make safe maneuvering diffi-

99. Carter, supra note 4, at 514.

100. See Mostert, supra note 93, at 18; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1975, at 43, col. 6;
id., Sept. 26, 1974, at 55, col. 7.
101. Extraordinary efforts to salvage the Metula kept the size of the spill
from being as extensive as it otherwise might have been. The oil that did spill,
however, was allowed to disperse naturally into the ocean. See Mostert, supra
note 93, at 35.
102. Meese, supra note 13, at 111 n.53. According to another source, approximately eighty-five percent of all oil spills occur within fifty miles of a coastline.
D. MALINs, EFFECTS OF PETROLEUM ON ARCTIc AND SUBARCTIC MARiNEENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANISMS 99 (1977).

103. See Anderson, National and International Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 30 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 985, 1000 (1976).

104. Id. at 998.
105. Meese, supra note 13, at 81.
106. Grove, Giants That Move the World's Oil: Superships, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July

1978, at 102, 104.
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cult.10 7 When traveling at sixteen knots, a 250,000 ton ship takes
approximately twenty-two minutes and three nautical miles to
stop.10 8 The huge size of VLCCs increases the risk of grounding,
collision, and other mishaps, as well as the potential harm from
such an accident.10 9 Any accident involving a VLCC has the potential to spill enormous amounts of oil.
While oil spills are very damaging, they are not the primary
source of oil pollution in the ocean. Most vessel-source oil pollution results from the intentional, routine cleaning of a vessel's

tanks. 110 In the past, tanks were rinsed out with water that was

emptied into the sea as an "intentional operational discharge."
This water is more easily absorbed into the sea than the heavy
crude from an oil spill. Although each actual discharge is a small
percentage of a tanker's total capacity, the quantity of oil discharged by this method is great because the total capacity of
tanker vessels ranges from 200,000 to 500,000 tons of oil."'
New procedures such as the load-on-top method (LOT), segregated ballast tanks, and the use of special port facilities have sig-

nificantly reduced the intentional operational discharge problem.
The LOT method has the potential to reduce the oil discharged
by ninety-nine percent.1 12 Unfortunately, because no adequate

monitoring system exists, the LOT method's effectiveness depends upon a crew's diligence. 1 " Some oil companies are replac-

107. Mostert, supra note 93, at 22.
108. Id.; see Gold, Marine Salvage Law, Supertankers and Oil Pollution:
New Pressureson Ancient Law, 11 REVUE DE DRorr, U. SHERBROOKE 127, 140-41
(1980).
109. Cf. Smets, The Oil Spill Risk: Economic Assessment and Compensation Limit, 14 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 23 (1983) (discussing economic factors increasing risk of pollution damage relative to various compensation ceilings).
110. Mostert, supra note 93, at 25; see Note, Prevention of Operational
Maritime Oil Pollution: A Necessary Solution to an Unnecessary Problem, 4
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 63, 69 (1977); see also Nunuparov, A Study of the Formation of Unpumpable Residues of Crude Oil on Tankers for the Purpose of
Preventing Marine Pollution, MARINE TECH. Soc'Y J., Sept. 17, 1977, at 9 (examining crude oil residues in tankers).
111. One estimate places the oil contained in the rinse water at about 0.35
percent of the original oil cargo. M'GONIGLE, supra note 18, at 16.
112. D. MALINS, supra note 102, at 98. Contra M'GoNIGLE, supra note 18, at
18-19. A workshop sponsored by the Ocean Affairs Board of the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences in 1973 estimated that the LOT method was 90 percent
effective, while secret oil industry studies place the figure close to 50 percent. Id.
113. M'GONrILE, supra note 18, at 19.
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ing LOT with the crude-oil washing method (COW). In the COW
method, a vessel's tanks are rinsed with a lighter oil, which dissolves the heavier crude and forms a mixture that is then pumped
out. This is more effective than the LOT method because it occurs in port and, therefore, can be monitored easily. It is timeconsuming, however, and congests port traffic. If not properly
performed, this method also poses hazards because of the highly
explosive gases produced. 1 4
To alleviate these problems, President Carter proposed regulations in 1977 for all United States and foreign tankers over 20,000
dwt. that dock at United States ports.11 5 These regulations proposed the imposition of: (1) double bottoms on all new tankers;
(2) segregated ballast tanks on all tankers; (3) inert gas systems
on all tankers; (4) backup radar systems, including collision
avoidance equipment, on all tankers; and (5) improved emergency
steering standards for all tankers.116 Congress adopted most of
these proposals by incorporating them into the Port and Tanker
Safety Act of 1978.117 These "construction, design, equipment,
and manning" standards (CDEM standards) must be applied
carefully, 18 or they may be considered invalid unilateral extensions of jurisdiction.119 The need for uniform, reasonable environmental legislation to protect the oceans from vessel-source pollution is critical to effecuate the overall goal of "maintaining a
favorable legal order.

1 20

It should be noted that "vessel-source

114. Id. at 132.
115. President Announces Measures To Control Marine Oil Pollution, 76
DEP'T ST. BULL. 422 (1977); see also Lester, Domestic Structure and International Technological Collaboration:Ocean PollutionRegulation, 8 OCEAN DEV.
& INT'L L.J. 299 (1980) (examining the government-society relationship in oil

pollution regulation).
116. 76 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 422.
117. Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1221-32, 46 U.S.C. §§ 214, 391(a) (1982)). The proposals were also adopted, with
some modifications, in the 1978 SOLAS Protocol. See Popp, supra note 16, at

20-21.
118. Bernhardt, A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L. 265, 268 (1980).

119. Id. at 277-78. For an historical analysis of how unilateral extensions of
jurisdiction impacted upon UNCLOS I, see Kindt, Special Claims Impacting
Upon Marine PollutionIssues at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 397, 442-44 (1980).
120. Moore, A Foreign Policy for the Oceans, in THE OcEANs AND U.S. FoR-
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pollution contributes only about one-fourth to one-third of pollu-

tion in the oceans from oil and this percentage is probably much
lower for other pollutants such as heavy metals or persistent pesticides.

'121

Most marine oil pollution is the result of land-based

pollution sources and its subcategory, airborne pollution.122 Although there is some indication that other pollutants may present
a more serious and persistent threat to the marine environment
than pollution from oil spills, vessel-source oil pollution "has received the most study and has the most developed institutional
and legal basis for dealing [with such pollution]. 1 23 Because intentional operational discharges are the major source of vesselsource oil pollution, the use of the LOT "segregated ballast" technique in addition to other pollution control technology, can reduce oil pollution at relatively low costs.1 24

B. Historical Background
There has been little progress toward controlling oil pollution
through the regulation of tanker safety since the Torrey Canyon
accident in 1967. Few multilateral proposals have succeeded in
acquiring sufficient assent from nations to enter into force, and no
proposal has been all-encompassing. As a result, coastal states
5
have felt compelled to act unilaterally. 2

Questions as to the efficacy and the adequacy of unilateral action to control vessel-source pollution definitely exist. From the
standpoint of both an individual nation and the international
community, unilateral solutions can be undesirable. One writer
has noted:
[U]nilateral action by the United States might influence other
countries to implement regulations impeding the passage of
merchant vessels, naval ships and submarines. This interference
with freedom of navigation on the high seas would be a threat to
U.S. security and therefore an undesirable side effect of pollution
1, 2, 4 (Center for Oceans Law & Policy, Apr. 1978).
121. Moore, supra note 5, at 39-40.
122. Id. at 40.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Examples of such initiatives are Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 2 (1st Supp. 1970), and the United States reaction to the Argo Merchant accident. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying
EIGN POLICY

text.
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control. The question remains unanswered whether unilateral action can solve the pollution problem without jeopardizing other national security interests. An even more fundamental question is
whether unilateral action by any particular state can deal effectively with transnational pollution. Unilateral action, without cooperation from other nation-states, can solve only part of the problem. Given the transnational characteristics of the petroleum and
shipping industries and the interdependence of nation-states, a
transnational approach to the problem would be preferred. The
problem of pollution is a good example12of how national security is
intertwined with international security. 2

Until a truly transnational approach is successfully implemented, vessel-source pollution will continue to increase. Experience has shown that a tanker tends to break down more frequently as the ship ages. 1 27 Most of the supertankers over 200,000
dwt. will become fifteen years old during the 1980s, and as the
risk of structural failures increases with age, so does the potential
for catastrophic oil spills. 128 In addition to the potential structural
hazards, many of the nautical charts used during the 1980s are
based on surveys approximately sixty years old. 129 The extreme
drafts of modern supertankers necessitates the preparation of
new nautical charts.
C. Trends and Conditioning Factors
1. General Trends and Conditioning Factors
Any analysis of the legal problems involved with vessel-source
oil pollution must begin with the ideas of Hugo Grotius. Several
centuries ago, Grotius' ideas formed the basis of the traditional
laws of the sea. 130 Grotius believed the seas were virtually infinite-they could not be possessed, nor could their resources be
depleted.
As transoceanic commerce expanded, these paradigmatic beliefs
were conditioned further by a variety of factors, including: (1) the
126. Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution:A Threat to National
Security? 3 Hous. J. IN'r. L. 67, 92 (1980); see also Kindt, supra note 119, at
442-44.
127. See M'GONIGLE, supra note 18, at 20.
128. Carter, supra note 4, at 514.
129. Mostert, supra note 93, at 41.
130.

See Scott, Introductory Note,

ix-x (1916).

H. GROriUS, THE FREEDOM

OF THE SEAS
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drive of multinational oil and shipping companies to maximize
profits;8 1 (2) the strategic naval interests of the United States
and the Soviet Union; 131 (3) the desire of coastal states to protect
their coastal resources; 3s (4) the desire of flag states to promote
inexpensive free trade; (5) the view among developing countries,
who wish to exploit the seas, that pollution control is a luxury of
the rich nations; and (6) the concern of environmental organizations to safeguard the ecological purity of the seas.13 4
a.

The IMCO

The formation of IMCO in 1958 was one of the first efforts to
address the oil pollution problem. Although not specifically created to regulate pollution of the seas, the regulation of maritime
pollution became its primary focus during the 1980s, as IMCO
was the most effective international organization with jurisdiction
over maritime affairs. 3 5 IMCO, however, has traditionally had no
regulatory authority, but instead has been limited to an advisory
and consultative role. The scope of IMCO's actions has been further restricted by the fact that its budget is the smallest of any
United Nations agency.1 36 IMCO sponsors conferences on matters
pertaining to the seas, and those member states attending draft
agreements which resemble treaties. If a draft convention is ratified by fifteen nations who together control fifty percent of the
world's gross tonnage of registered shipping, the convention will
enter into force.13 7 Thus, the ratification process helps to achieve
uniformity in international standards and regulations because
once a country ratifies a convention, its national laws must be in
compliance with that convention.'" The ratification procedure
may, however, create problems because member states are often
slow to ratify maritime conventions.1 39 Those states who quickly
ratify a convention may find their merchant fleets at a competitive disadvantage until a sufficient number of nations ratify that

131. Anderson, supra note 103, at 990.
132. Id. at 995.
133. Id. at 994.

134. Id. at 995.
135. M'GONIGLE, supra note 18, at 39.
136. Id. at 142.
137. SPu.L CONFMMENCE, supra note 92, at 4.
138. Id. at 26.
139. M'GONIGLE, supra note 18, at 142.
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particular convention to bring it into force. Enforcement of conventions has been sporadic due to the lack of a uniform worldwide enforcement system. Article II(B) of IMCO requires ratifying nations to enforce provisions against any ships entering
territorial waters, and enforcement, therefore, is left to the discretion of the individual nations.
b. UNCLOS III
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) also discussed protection of the seas. The conference initiated the development of a comprehensive international
body of law covering all maritime matters, including oil pollution,
culminating with the issuance of the LOS Convention. 140 Although IMCO is not expressly mentioned in article 211 of the
LOS Convention,' it is understood that IMCO is to govern vessel-source pollution. The intent of the LOS Convention was to
prevent and control pollution by adopting and enforcing generally
accepted international rules and standards. Under the LOS Convention a coastal state at whose port a vessel is docked may prosecute the vessel for violations of these "generally accepted rules
and standards. 1 '

42

Because countries still consider their fleets to

be an immutable part of their sovereign power, responsibility for
enforcement of the LOS Convention lies primarily with the country in which the vessel is registered-the flag state. A coastal
state may not pass CDEM standards regulating foreign vessels
unless those regulations give effect to "generally accepted rules
'14 3
and standards.
c. The Flag of Convenience
The gravamen of the enforcement problem is the "flag of convenience" nation. Shipowners prefer to register their ships in flag
of convenience countries with liberal registration requirements,
such as Liberia and Panama.1 44 The tonnage carried by ships reg140.

See supra note 36.

141.

Id. art. 211.

142. Herman, Flags of Convenience-New Dimensions to an Old Problem,
24 McGILL L.J. 1, 21 (1978); see LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 211, 218;
M'Gonigle & Zacher, International Problem of Marine Pollution, INT'L PEmP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 8, 9.
143. Herman, supra note 142, at 20-21.
144. Id. at 1. Typical of the "conveniences" to shipowners are guarantees of
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istered in these countries increased rapidly through the 1970s. 1 45

Many of these small countries have among the largest tanker
fleets in the world. These fleets generally do not accommodate the
flag state's trade, but instead carry the cargo of other nations. In
fact, it is not uncommon for these vessels never to reach their
flag-state ports. The flag of convenience countries lack any incentive to impose more stringent regulations because stricter regulations would adversely affect their economic interests. These states
derive a substantial portion of their revenue from registration
fees.146 If one country imposed stricter controls on the design,
construction, manning, or operation of their fleets, that country
would cease to be "convenient.' '

47

In addition, small flag states

simply do not have the capability to enforce international standards or regulations on a global scale. Shipowners take advantage
of this situation, and as a result there are many substandard vessels on the seas.
2. CatastrophicIntervention
After an oil spill has occurred, questions often arise concerning
the right of intervention for the states involved. The right of intervention has been extensively debated and analyzed since the
4
British Government intervened in the Torrey Canyon accident.
anonymity, a low incidence of taxation, and mortgage financing provisions that
provide greater security to persons financing the vessels. Meese, supra note 13,
at 83-84. By contrast, United States laws require its flag ships to carry United
States crews and their correspondingly high wages. These costs also make it
much more expensive to use United States shipyards to construct VLCCs. Id. at
82-83.
145. See Payne, supra note 126, at 74.
146. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 21, at 54.
147. Meese, supra note 13, at 84-85.
148. The various interests involved in the Torrey Canyon accident have been
described as follows:
[T]he ship was owned by a Bermuda corporation which was controlled by
an American oil corporation, was registered in and flew the flag of Liberia,
and was manned by an Italian crew. It was chartered by a British oil company partially owned by the British government, was insured by companies in the United States and Great Britain. It was claimed for salvage by
a Dutch corporation. It had sunk in international waters and had caused
oil pollution in the United Kingdom, France and the States of Guernsey.
The official investigation as to the sinking was in Italy at the behest of the
Liberian government and was conducted by Americans.
Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward a New Solution to the Problem of
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It is very difficult to delineate which country or countries have
the right to intervene and to gauge the extent of that right. Competing interests often arise between the coastal state, which wants
to protect its coastal environment, and the flag state, which wants
to maintain its recognized right of jurisdiction over its ships.
The right of intervention seems justified under the principle of
self-protection. This rationale justifies any measures adopted by a
state faced with some danger affecting its vital interests. Although "self-defense" is occasionally suggested as a rationale for
intervention, self-defense generally applies only to matters of national security and must be liberally construed to include oil pollution. The "necessity" rationale is also periodically used to justify intervention. Rather than giving rise to a right, this concept
is utilized
merely to excuse an act that would otherwise be
149
illegal.
The 1969 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention) 50 was initiated after the Torrey Canyon catastrophe. The
Intervention Convention is now in force internationally and is adhered to by the United States. To intervene under its rules, a
coastal state must show that the threat of pollution presents a
grave and imminent danger to its coastlines or related interests, 151
and the incident must involve oil pollution from privately-owned
ships15 2 of a member state of the Intervention Convention. The
Intervention Convention does not, however, cover intentional operational discharges. 1 3
When an oil pollution casualty occurs, coastal states must first
consult with any other states affected before taking any action.
All parties should be notified without delay, and informed of the
measures proposed. Immediate notification is not required "in
cases of extreme urgency," but notification must follow as soon as
is possible.154 No prohibitions on intervention exist other than
those conditions listed above. Any measures considered necessary
Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 CONN. L. REv. 632, 637-38 (1970).
149. Emanuelli, The Right of Intervention of Coastal States on the High
Seas in Cases of Pollution Casualties, 25 U.N.B.L.J. 79, 90 (1976).
150. Intervention Convention, supra note 22.
151. Emanuelli, supra note 149, at 82.
152. Warships are exempted. Intervention Convention, supra note 22, art. I,
para. 2.
153. Emanuelli, supra note 149, at 83.
154. Id. at 84.

19841

VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION

can be taken, subject to a test of "reasonableness.' 155 The intervening country should weigh the benefits of the measures to be
taken against the costs of the potential damage that could result
from those actions by balancing the following three factors: (1)
the extent and probability of imminent danger; (2) the likelihood
that protective measures will be effective; and (3) the extent of
damage likely to be caused by the proposed protective
156
measures.
The Convention attempts to offset the extensive right of intervention available to coastal states by providing a mechanism for
the peaceful settlement of disputes arising from intervention. On
an international level, proceedings can be initiated by any party
involved. The potential right to recover from a coastal state under
the Intervention Convention is aimed primarily at preventing
abuses of the right of intervention. To receive compensation,
claimants must prove that the coastal state did not meet the
"reasonableness" test, and that it violated the terms of the Intervention Convention. Within these guidelines, coastal states have
broad powers to intervene and protect their interests.
These principles remain basically intact under article 221 of the
LOS Convention. Article 221 allows a coastal state to intervene
beyond its territorial sea "pursuant to international law" and "to
take and enforce measures" to protect its coastline. Like the Intervention Convention, the right to intervene under article 221
hinges on a "reasonableness" test.' 57
3.

Ice-Covered Areas

The polar regions present special problems for controlling vessel-source pollution. One question is what law should govern the
regions. Canada passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act' 5 8 soon after the oil tanker S.S. Manhattansailed the Northwest Passage in 1969.159 Canada was initially criticized for its uni-

155. Id. at 83.
156. Id. at 85.
157. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 221.
158. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 2 (1st Supp. 1970).
159. M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 142, at 9. The S.S. Manhattan was a
modified ice-breaking supertanker. Although it sailed without incident from the
Alaskan oil fields to the east coast of the United States, the voyage dramatically
heightened Canadian concern over potential oil pollution of the Arctic. See
Kindt, supra note 119, at 437-38.
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lateral action, but the Act is now generally accepted by the Arctic
countries.160 UNCLOS III also considered the Arctic a special
area. 16 ' Article 234 of the LOS Convention protects the freedom
of navigation, 62 while generally delegating to coastal states the
regulation of vessel-source pollution in "ice-covered areas." Naturally, this provision also applies to the Antarctic (although the
Antarctic has few coastal states).
Because of the unique nature of the Arctic and the Antarctic, it
remains unclear how the law governing these regions will develop.
Arguably, neither area has been subject to the traditional laws of
the sea because many of the activities on which those laws were
originally founded, such as fishing and transport, never occurred
in the Arctic or the Antarctic to any significant degree. 16 3 Nevertheless, these areas deserve particular attention because the effects of oil spills in the polar regions are much more persistent
than in warmer climates. 1" Because these areas may also have a
unique effect on global climate, pollution-induced changes in either polar region could drastically alter the climate throughout
the world. 6 5 Until more detailed scientific information is available, these regions should be protected as "international marine
sanctuaries."
III.
A.

THE GENERAL LAW OF THE SEA PROVISIONS

A Historical Overview of Vessel-Source Pollution
and UNCLOS III

The first substantive session of UNCLOS III was convened in
Caracas, Venezuela, on June 20, 1974.168 Preparatory negotiations

had revealed great concern over preserving traditional freedoms
of the high seas and widespread agreement on the need for protecting the oceans for navigation.167 These concerns focused pri160.
161.
162.
163.

supra note 92, at 114.
M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 142, at 9.
LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 234.
Feder, A Legal Regime for the Arctic, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 811 (1978).
164. M'GONIGLE, supra note 18, at 28.
165. Feder, supra note 163, at 792.
166. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: The 1974 CaracasSession, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CaracasSession].
167. Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1974).
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marily on coastal state jurisdiction beyond their territorial sea l16
and the regime for straits used for international navigation." 9 As
the first session concluded, however, "expanded coastal state jurisdiction. . . appear[ed] assured"' 7 0 with the establishment of a
twelve-mile territorial sea and the new two-hundred mile "economic zone.''7
The second session in 1975, resulted in the Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT) 17 2 and vested primary responsibility for vessel-source pollution with the flag states. Recognizing that flag
states may not be the states most affected by pollution, the SNT
imposed a general duty on all states to preserve the marine environment, 7 3 and granted specific powers to coastal states to establish international standards.7 4 These powers included: (1) requiring the express approval of a coastal state before dumping waste
within a zone (of unspecified distance) extending from that state's
coast; (2) permitting the establishment of "more effective" standards for vessel-source pollution, provided that they are not
CDEM standards and do not hamper innocent passage; and (3)
the establishment of higher standards within the state's economic
zone if the combination of "severe climatic conditions" and pollution may result in major harm to the ecological balance.17 5 The
SNT, however, carefully circumscribed enforcement rights of
coastal states and limited the substantial rights and duties of enforcement to flag states and port states. 76
The Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), 7 7 implemented

168. Id. at 23.
169. Id. at 10. Most participants favored unimpeded passage through straits.
1974 CaracasSession, supra note 166, at 15.
170. 1974 Caracas Session, supra note 166, at 2.
171. Id.
172. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Parts I, H, H, 4 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 137

(1975) [herein-

after cited as SNT]; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Part IV, 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS
OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 111 (1976).
Regarding the straits regime, a right of "transit passage" was established. Ste-

venson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 773 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Geneva Session].
173. 1975 Geneva Session, supra note 172, at 788.
174. Id. at 788.

175. Id. at 790.
176.

See id. at 791-92.

177.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.l/Parts I, II,

m, 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS
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in 1976, refined these pollution provisions and instituted a regime
of balanced duties between flag states and coastal states, within a
coastal state's economic zone. The RSNT granted coastal states
the right to designate special areas within their economic zone in
which antipollution standards established by the "competent international organization" could be implemented.178 It also gave
these coastal states the right to regulate certain vessels in ice-covered areas. 17 9 In cases of unlawful discharge, a coastal state could
inspect vessels-or, in more severe cases, bring proceedings
against them-as long as certain safeguards, including a flag
1 0 The enstate's right of preemptive jurisdiction, were respected.2
vironmental rights and duties under the RSNT constitute a class
of exceptions to traditional high seas freedoms, including a flag
state's right of exclusive jurisdiction over their vessels.18
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), 82 released
in 1977, reduced some of the restrictions on coastal state control
of pollution within the territorial sea, but retained the prohibition
on CDEM standards.1 83 By this time, the most significant disputes over the treaty were primarily political disagreements over
mining operations in deep seabeds. The ICNT resolved certain
disputes by clarifying the status of the new economic zones and
identifying the traditional high seas freedoms that were preserved
within those economic zones.1 '
Other relatively minor revisions. and clarifications followed in
subsequent sessions in 1978, 1979, and 1980. These were embod-

OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE

SEA 125 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as RSNT]; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Rev.2/Part IV, 6 OFFICIAL REcoRDs OF THE THIRD UNMD NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAw OF THE

SEA 144 (1977).
178. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 261-62 (1977).
179. Id. at 262.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 260-62.
182. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10, 8 OFFICAL. RECORDS OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited

as ICNT].
183. Oxman, The Third United Nation's [sic] Conference on the Law of the

Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 62 (1978). The ICNT
dealt with the issue of straits used for international navigation as a completely

separate matter. Id.
184. See id. at 67-74.
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ied in the revisions to the ICNT 18 5 and finally in the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.1 86 These revisions clarified both
the right of intervention under international law and a coastal
state's rights with respect to vessels in innocent passage through
the state's territorial sea.187 For the first time, a coastal state
could also promulgate CDEM standards, but only if "such laws
and regulations give effect to generally accepted rules or standards."188 The right was carefully limited to ships "in innocent
passage in one state's territorial sea that are heading for a port in
another state."L8 9
B.
1.

Ports and Internal Waters

Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution

The general principle governing vessel-source pollution in ports
and internal waters is "port-state jurisdiction." Under article 211,
paragraph 3 of the LOS Convention, a port state must communicate to "the competent international organization" any conditions
or requirements concerning marine pollution with which a foreign
vessel must conform before the vessel is granted entry into the
port state's internal waters or ports."' IMCO is generally considered the "competent international organization" by maritime
states, although many developing countries do not readily admit
this.1 91 The LOS Convention does not specify that vessel-source
pollution in ports or internal waters is to be regulated exclusively
by port states, but port state jurisdiction is assumed because internal waters have traditionally been considered to be part of a
coastal state and thus subject to its jurisdiction.
The LOS Convention does allow for regulation by a state other
than the port state in a specific instance. When a foreign vessel is

185. See Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2, U.N. Doe. A/
CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev.2]; Informal
Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev.1].
186. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62WP.10/Rev.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

DC(IT)].
187. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (1979).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211, para. 3.
191. Bernhardt, supra note 118, at 274.
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navigating within the territorial sea of a state that participates in
a regional arrangement to prevent vessel-source pollution, that
vessel must furnish upon request, "information as to whether it is
proceeding to a State . . . participating in such co-operative arwhether it complies with the port enrangements and, if so, ..
19 2 A vessel that is simply proState.
that
of
try requirements
ceeding outside or through the region does not have to respond.
The limitation on this right of intervention is that a coastal state
must do so "without prejudice to the continued exercise by a vessel of its right of innocent passage or to the application of article
25, paragraph 2. ''193 Under article 25, paragraph 2, "[iln the case
of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility
outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to
take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions

to which admission of those ships
2.

. . .

is subject.'2194

Enforcement by Flag States

The enforcement of international rules and standards within a
state's internal waters is the primary obligation of the flag state.
Flag states must ensure that their fleets meet all applicable international and national rules and standards, and are obligated to
take enforcement action in any jurisdictional zone in which a violation occurs.19 5 Under articles 211 and 217 of the LOS Convention, 19 6 flag states must comply with standards established by
IMCO and its general diplomatic conferences,'" as well as investigate and prosecute any violations of IMCO standards.' While
investigating and prosecuting alleged violations, flag states may
request assistance from other states. 99 "[Flag] States shall, at the
written request of any State, investigate any violation alleged to
have been committed by [their] vessels, ' 20 0 and must promptly
inform the requesting state and IMCO of actions taken against

192. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211, para. 3.

193. Id.
194. Id. art. 25, para. 2.
195. See Meese, supra note 13, at 89; Bernhardt, supra note 118, at 296.
196. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211, para. 2; id. art. 217.

197. Id. art. 217, para. 1.
198. Id. art. 217, para. 4.
199. Id. art. 217, para. 5.
200. Id. art. 217, para. 6.
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the violators. 20 1 The penalties imposed by flag
states must be "ad'20 2
equate in severity to discourage violations.

Flag states are also required to enforce the "design, construction, equipment and manning" requirements of their vessels.20 3
Coastal states, therefore, cannot unilaterally restrict navigation in
their internal waters, territorial seas, or economic zones by requiring vessel design or safety features that exceed international standards.20 ' Certification of a vessel by its flag state is prima facie
evidence that the vessel complies with international standards.20 5
3. Enforcement by Port States
The enforcement of international rules and standards by a vessel's port state is authorized 20 6 in articles 218 to 220 of the LOS
Convention,0 7 and is predicated on the requirement that the vessel be "voluntarily" within the port of the state claiming jurisdiction.208 Reflecting one of the treaty's most important innovations,
a discharge violation occurring on the high seas is subject to port
state enforcement. 20 9 Discharge violations that occur in another
country's internal waters, territorial sea, or economic zone are
subject to port state enforcement only if enforcement is requested
by the injured country, the flag state, or a country threatened by
the pollution. 210 Defects in a vessel's seaworthiness are arguably
tantamount to continuing violations of CDEM standards 21 and,
under article 219, subject to port state enforcement, including detention, regardless of where the potential pollution occurred.212
Although article 220 refers to coastal state enforcement, it is a de
201. Id. art. 217, para. 7.
202. Id. art. 217, para. 8.
203. Id. art. 217, para. 2.
204.

See id. art. 21, para. 2 (relating to innocent passage).

205. Id. art. 217, para. 3.
206. Note that port state enforcement is not obligatory, but a discretionary

right of action. At least one commentator has criticized this, suggesting that it
weakens the viability of a port state enforcement regime as a compromise be-

tween traditional flag state enforcement and coastal state enforcement, the latter of which is seen as more threatening to the freedom of navigation. See Bern-

hardt, supra note 118, at 284-87.
207.

LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 218-20.

208. See id., art. 218, paras. 1, 3.
209. Id. art. 218, para. 1.
210. Id. art. 218, para. 2.
211.
212.

See Bernhardt, supra note 118, at 288.
See LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 219..,
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facto type of port state enforcement for violations occurring
within the territorial sea or economic zone of the port state. 13
C.

Straits Used for International Navigation

It is fundamental that a straits regime preserve the community
interest in using the straits and the international interest in freedom of navigation, while protecting the strait state's legitimate
interests in safety and environmental protection.2 1 4 Part III of the
LOS Convention recognizes four categories of straits involving international navigation. The first category consists of those straits
for which existing international conventions guarantee freedom of
navigation; 215 examples include the Danish Straits, the Turkish
Straits, and the Strait of Magellan.2 1 Article 35(c) of the LOS
Convention states that part III does not control or modify the
legal regimes of these straits;2 17 those legal regimes continue to
regulate marine pollution in the straits provided they do not infringe upon navigational freedoms.
The second category of straits is governed by article 36 of the
LOS Convention, which also states that part III does not apply to
those straits used for international navigation and having
"through the strait a route through the high seas or through an
exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to
navigational and hydrographical characteristics. '218 Vessel-source
pollution in these straits is subject to the regulations of article
211, the usual article governing vessel-source pollution. 21 9
The third category of straits are regulated by the concept of
"transit passage" 220 under article 37. Transit passage straits con-

213. Id. art. 220, para. 1. The "voluntarily within a port" language in article
220, paragraph 1, supports this interpretation. Contra Bernhardt, supra note
118, at 284-94.
214. Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 78-79 (1980).
215. Id. at 111; see LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 35(c).
216. Moore, supra note 214, at 111.
217. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 35(c).
218. Id. art. 36; Moore, supra note 214, at 111.
219. See LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211.
220. Moore, supra note 214, at 111; for Convention laws governing transit

passage, see LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 37-44. "Transit passage" has
been loosely defined by one writer as "implying considerably more freedom to
navigational interests than would be contemplated under 'innocent passage,'
though not the total freedom possible in high seas transit." Maduro, Passage
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sist of those "straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone. 2 21 Article 38 states, however, that transit passage may be
'222
impeded for those straits falling within the "island exception.
The great majority of straits used for international navigation are
within this third category. 223 One of the duties of ships in transit
passage is to "comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution from ships." 224 Article 42 of the LOS
Convention 225 grants states bordering straits a limited right to:
1 .... adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage
through straits, in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as provided in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving
effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait
226

Although article 42 permits states bordering straits to enforce
IMCO's standards regarding vessel-source pollution, these states
may not use the claim of protecting the marine environment to
interfere with a vessel's right of transit passage.
The subsequent provision, which provides that countries in this
category may regulate the "loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in contravention of . . . [its] customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations," 227 should
not be interpreted as an ocean dumping regulation. User states
and states bordering straits in this category are required to coop-

Through International Straits: The Prospects Emerging From the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 70
(1980). The right of transit passage, unlike that of innocent passage, may not be
suspended for any reason. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 44.
221. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 37.
222. Id. art. 38, para. 1; see Moore, supra note 214, at 111. For a description
of what constitutes an "island exception," see infra text accompanying notes
229-36.
223. Moore, supra note 214, at 111.
224. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 39, para. 2(b).
225. Id. art. 42, para. 1(a)-(b).
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 42, para. 1(d)(emphasis added).
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erate by agreement for2' 28the "prevention, reduction and control of
pollution from ships.

The final category consists of those straits governed by article
45.229 The category includes "island exception" straits which are

formed by "an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland . . . [when] there exists seaward of the island a route

through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of
similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics. 2 3 0 Examples of island exception straits include the Pemba Strait (between Pemba Island and the
Tanzanian mainland) and the Messina Strait (between the Italian
mainland and Sicily). 2 31 Article 45 also governs those straits that

lie "between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and the territorial sea of a foreign State.

'2 32

This category in-

cludes the Strait of Tiran, Head Harbor Passage, the Strait of
Georgia, and the Gulf of Honduras, "all of which are overlapped
by a 3-mile territorial sea.

'2 33

The entire category of straits is

governed by the principle of "nonsuspendable innocent passage"
pursuant to article 45 and part II, section 3 of the LOS Convention. 23 ' This principle was first established under the 1958 Con-

vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 3 5 Vessel-source pollution in these straits is also governed by article
211.236

In addition, part XIP37 of the LOS Convention contains the
traditional safeguards of marine pollution regulations. Article 233
specifically provides for "[s]afeguards
with respect to straits used
238
for international navigation.

228. Id. art. 43(b). It should also be noted that "straits in archipelagic waters
would be governed by the equivalent regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage."
Moore, supra note 214, at 111.
229. Moore, supra note 214, at 111; LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 45.
230. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 38, para. 1; see Moore, supra note
214, at 111.
231. Moore, supra note 214, at 112.
232. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 45, para. 1(b).
233. Moore, supra note 214, at 112.
234. Id. at 111-12; see LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 17-32, 45.
235. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205
(entered into force for the United States Sept. 10, 1964).
236. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211.
237. Id. arts. 192-237.
238. Id. art. 233.
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[I]f a foreign ship other than those referred to in section 10 [warships] has committed a violation of the laws and regulations referred to in article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), causing or threatening major damage to the marine environment of the straits, the
States bordering the straits may take appropriate enforcement
measures and if so shall respect mutatis mutandis the provisions
of this section.23 9
A vessel's right of innocent passage is superior to the right of a
bordering strait state to protect the marine environment. In any
conflict between the rights of innocent passage or of transit passage and the right to protect the marine environment, the freedoms of navigation must prevail.2 40
D.
1.

The Territorial Sea

Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution

Territorial seas have traditionally been considered to be extensions of the national sovereignty of coastal states. The maximum
territorial sea that can be claimed pursuant to article 3 of the
2 42
LOS Convention is twelve nautical miles.241 The ICNT/Rev.1
strengthened the international rule of innocent passage through
territorial seas, 243 and a coastal state's "regulatory competence
over pollution from vessels in innocent passage [was] . . .clarified to balance environmental concerns and protection of navigational rights. '244 Article 21, paragraph 1(f) of the LOS Convention
provides that with respect to innocent passage, a coastal state
may make laws for "the preservation of the environment of the
coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof . . ,2..
Paragraph 2, however, adds that "[s]uch
laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards. 2 46
Pursuant to article 211 of the LOS Convention, coastal states
may regulate vessel-source pollution within their territorial seas,
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 3.
See supra note 185.
Moore, supra note 214, at 116.
Id.
LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 21, para. 1(f).
Id. art. 21, para. 2; Moore, supra note 214, at 116.
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but they may not interfere with a vessel's right of innocent
47
passage.
2.

Flag-State, Port-State, and Coastal-StateEnforcement

Primary enforcement of vessel-source pollution is vested in the
flag state under article 217,248 while secondary enforcement is
vested in the coastal state under article 220.249 Article 220 provides that a coastal state may institute proceedings for violations
of its national standards or IMCO's regulations involving vessel-

source pollution in the territorial sea or in the economic zone of
that coastal state, against vessels voluntarily in a port or off-shore

terminal of the state.250
Article 220, paragraph 2, provides the additional enforcement

powers of inspection and detention to coastal states when clear
grounds exist for believing that a vessel has violated a state's regulation. 251 The remaining coastal state provisions found in article

247. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211, para. 4. This paragraph states:
Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and
control of marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels exercising the right of innocent passage. Such laws and regulations shall, in accordance with Part II, section 3, not hamper innocent passage of foreign
vessels.
Id.
At first, this provision appears to be contradictory, but the conflict disappears
when it is read within the context of the "innocent passage" section to which it
refers; namely, part II, section 3 of the LOS Convention. Id. arts. 17-32. The
paragraph immediately preceding this provision also adds perspective by specifically maintaining a vessel's right of innocent passage. Id. art. 211, para. 3. The
clear intent of article 211 is to allow coastal state regulation of vessel-source
pollution in their territorial sea, but to subordinate this right to the right of
innocent passage.
248. Id. art. 217.
249. Id. art. 220; see infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (concerning a
flag state's jurisdictional priorities).
250. Id. art. 220, para. 1.
251. Id. art. 220, para. 2. Paragraph 2 states:
Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the
territorial sea of a State has, during its passage therein, violated laws and
regulations of that State adopted in accordance with this Convention or
applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution from vessels, that State, without prejudice to the
application of the relevant provisions of Part II, section 3, may undertake
physical inspection of the vessel relating to the violation and may, where
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220 apply equally to any specially adopted rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to article 211, paragraph 6.252 There is
even less reason for interpreting these provisions as interfering
with the right of transit or the innocent passage of ships since
individual oil discharges can now be scientifically traced to specific ships.

2 53

E. The Economic Zone
Within its exclusive economic zone, a coastal state may not promulgate stricter regulations than those established by IMCO (except in ice-covered areas or for ocean dumping), but it may adopt
regulations that adhere to IMCO's standards. 2 " The gravamen of
article 211, paragraph 5, is to regulate pollution in economic zones
by giving effect to the IMCO regulations.2 55 As indicated earlier,
article 220, paragraph 1, allows a coastal state to take action if a

polluting ship is voluntarily within its port.256 In addition, a
coastal state may demand information from a vessel,2 57 physically
25 9
inspect it, 2 58 or detain and institute proceedings against a vessel
if, among other requirements, there are clear grounds for believing that a violation of applicable IMCO rules or standards has
occurred. Primary enforcement responsibility, however, still rethe evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the
vessel, in accordance with its laws, subject to the provisions of section 7.
Id.
252. Id. art. 220, para. 8. This provision emphasizes the importance of
marine sanctuaries by directing the application of paragraphs 3 through 7 of
article 220 to the "special marine areas" provision found in article 211, paragraph 6.
253. Various methods may be employed, including infrared spectroscopy,
fluorescence spectroscopy, gas chromatography, and thin-layer chromatography.
The U.S. Coast Guard has developed an oil spill identification system which
utilizes these methods. See U.S. COAST GUARD REsEARCH & DEv. CENTER, OIL
SPML IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (Nat'l Technical Information Services Report No.
ADA-044-750 1977). These methods have attained general acceptance among the
scientific and legal communities. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) has promulgated consensus standards regarding use of these methods in its standard ASTM D-3328.
254. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211, para. 5.
255. Id.
256. See supra text accompanying note 247.
257. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 220, para. 3.
258. Id. art. 220, para. 5.
259. Id. art. 220, para. 6.

322

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 172,37

sides with the flag state under article 217,260 and extensive coastal
state enforcement provisions of article 220 are generally secondary.26 ' In fact, subject to certain limitations, a flag state may preempt the jurisdiction of a coastal state pursuant to article 228.262
F. The High Seas
Article 211, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the LOS Convention delegate to IMCO the authority to regulate vessel-source pollution on
the high seas. 263 Primary authority for enforcement is vested in

the flag state under article 211, paragraph 2,2' and under the
general provisions of article 217.265 Secondary enforcement by
port states is authorized under article 218,266 which provides:
When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may undertake investigations and, where
the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any
discharge from that vessel outside the internal waters, territorial
sea, or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of applicable international rules and standards established through the
competent international
organization [IMCO] or general diplo2 67
matic conference.

The flag state or another state damaged or threatened by a viola-

tion may request that the port state institute proceedings, 268 in-

vestigate violations, 269 transfer records (to the flag state or coastal
state),270 or even transfer jurisdiction over an alleged violation to
the coastal state.21 Under article 228, the flag state may also seize
jurisdiction from the coastal state under particular
272
circumstances.

260. Id. art. 217.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See id. art. 220.
Id. art. 228.
Id. art. 211, paras. 1-2.
Id. art. 211, para. 2.
Id. art. 217.
Id. art. 218.
Id. art. 218, para. 1.

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. art. 218, para. 2.
Id. art. 218, para. 3.
Id. art. 218, para. 4.
Id.

272. Id. art. 228.
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G. Special Areas in the Oceans: Marine Sanctuaries
The idea of "wilderness areas" in the oceans gained momentum
throughout the 1970s. A better term for these regions may be
"marine sanctuaries," because under the United States concept of
domestic "wilderness areas," mechanized travel is forbidden, but
mechanized travel would never be restricted in a marine sanctuary. Discharges allowed in these areas, however, would be limited.
Portions of ice-covered areas may be designated as marine sanctuaries, but simply because an area is ice-covered should not necessarily mean that it should automatically be designated a sanctuary. The delineation is specifically outlined in article 234 of the
LOS Convention, which governs ice-covered areas and seeks to
maintain the freedoms of navigation in those areas.27 3

The main provision setting aside "special marine areas" for vessel-source pollution in economic zones is article 211, paragraph
6.271 The provision allows a coastal state to establish a special
marine area when there exists "recognized technical reasons in relation to.

.

.oceanographical and ecological conditions, as well as

[when the] utilization or the protection of [the coastal state's] resources and the particular character of its traffic.

action. ' 27 5

. .

justify the

protective
The establishment of a special marine area
must be accomplished through IMCO and in accordance with
IMCO's standards. 27 6 Although the administrative burden of establishing such an area may be onerous, 27 7 it is justified by the

partial abrogation of traditional freedoms of navigation. A major
portion of article 220, relating to enforcement by coastal states,
also applies to this section.7 8
IV.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the centuries since Grotius, the scope and contours of the
marine pollution problem have changed significantly, yet attitudes remain basically unaltered. Until the 1970s, the problem of
ocean pollution was considered to be insignificant because the
273.

Id. art. 234. For a discussion of the treatment of ice-covered areas, see

supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
274. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 211, para. 6.
275. Id.

276. Id.
277. Scientific and technical data in support of the submitting state's proposal must be included. Id.
278. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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ocean was thought to be able to absorb an unlimited amount of
pollution. If the oceans are to survive as a cradle of life, these
views will have to change. The countries of the world must strive
to protect the seas from oil and other hazardous substances.
Cleanup technologies must keep pace with new developments
in the oil industry to ensure an effective response to oil spills.
Greater emphasis should be placed on the effects of petroleum on
the marine environment. In addition, a new approach should be
taken for cleaning up international oil spills-the formation and
utilization of cooperatives. Joint efforts to curb an oil spill's damaging effects would be much faster and more effective than relying solely on either the company responsible for the spill or the
country affected by it. Economies of scale and the sharing of technologies and experience would be just a few of the possible advantages of cooperative efforts. In fact, the 1977 Oil Spill Conference
recommended greater consultation between cleanup specialists
and biologists. 2 7

Biologists can contribute valuable information

concerning sensitive marine areas. Consultation with them could
decrease the number of decisions that need to be made when an
oil spill occurs, resulting in a faster, more effective cleanup with
28 0
less environmental damage.

No organization can better organize these cooperatives than
IMCO. Comprised of over one-hundred states, IMCO's membership includes all of the major shipping countries.28 ' Member nations have the capability to implement comprehensive and consistent pollution regulations through IMCO conventions. Several
actions are needed, however, to derive maximum benefit from the
proposed enactment of these regulations. First, member states
should ratify and implement those conventions that are not yet in
force. Second, the existing methods for eliminating substandard
tankers must be improved. 28 2 IMCO should have the power to inspect tankers worldwide and to enforce the safety and pollution
standards of member states. Such power is not unprecedented in
international law; for example, the International Civil Aviation
Organization has regulatory power over international airspace.28 3

279.

SPILL CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 114.

280. Id.
281. Id. at 7.
282. Id. at 10.
283. U.S. Gives Position on Seabed Regime, Scientific Research, Straits,
and Economic Zone at Law of the Sea Conference, 71 DPr'T ST. BuLL. 402, 410
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IMCO needs similar power over international waters and ports.2
This power would provide the basis for uniform and effective enforcement of worldwide rules and standards by a nonpartisan
organization.
It isessential that the new evolving ocean law carefully balance
the world community's interest in freedom of navigation, the
right of coastal states to protect their maritime resources, and the
paramount interest in preserving the oceans. 8 5 These policy
objectives make international control through IMCO preferable to
unilateral coastal state control for many reasons. A system permitting the 130 coastal states to establish individual CDEM standards would be inefficient and would make ship operation impossible regardless of the reasonableness of individual CDEM

standards. 28 A system of 130 different CDEM standards would
undermine the need for stability of expectations and would increase costs by reducing the flexibility of vessels to interchange
voyages and routes.28 7 The establishment of international stan-

(1974) (statement of John Norton Moore, Deputy Special Representative of the
President and deputy chairman of the United States delegation to the Third
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, made before Committee H) [hereinafter cited
as Committee II Statement].
284. See LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 211, 217. The LOS Convention granted IMCO some power to regulate vessel-source pollution, but not exclusive authority. It is generally agreed that IMCO is intended to be the "competent international organization" within the articles of the LOS Convention
covering vessel-source pollution. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
The use of the plural term "international organizations" in article 211, paragraph 5, of ICNT/Rev.1, supra note 182, was an obvious typographical error, but
its presence jeopardized the intent of UNCLOS HI to utilize IMCO as the sole
"international organization" for regulating vessel-source pollution. In the fall of
1979, the need for the singular "international organization" in article 211 was
brought to the attention of Bernard Oxman, who was working on this section for
the United States Delegation to UNCLOS III, and the typographical error was
remedied in the subsequent revision. ICNTIRev.2, supra note 182; see Moore,
supra note 5, at 41.
285. The following four major types of claims reduce navigational freedom
and affect the regulation of vessel-source pollution: (1) the regulation of transit
through straits; (2) the regulation of transit through "archipelagic sealanes;" (3)
the control of vessel-source pollution within two-hundred nautical mile fishing
zones or "economic zones;" and (4) the control of navigation in certain unilaterally-declared "special areas" or "pollution control zones." Moore, supra note 5,
at 40.
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dards through IMCO enhances rapid global responses to innovative technological changes, which more effectively protects the environment while simultaneously lowering the costs of that
protection.28 There are equally effective lower cost policy options
for dealing with vessel-source pollution through both IMCO and
strengthened flag-state and port-state approaches.2 89 Coastalstate standard setting is more likely to result in political discrimination and invidious economic advantage or disadvantage and
thus increase the possibilities for conflict.2 90 Because more than
half of all coastal states are totally zone-locked by two-hundred
mile territorial zones, coastal-state standard setting could seriously impair the "oceans access independence" of the zone-locked
states. 291 The "demonstration effect" of allowing coastal-state
control over vessel-source pollution would encourage "creeping
territoriality" over other navigational freedoms and would encroach upon the common community interest in the oceans. 29 2
Standard setting by individual states is also undemocratic,
whereas setting international standards permits participation by
all concerned states.293 Finally, international standards also increase environmental protection on a global basis because vesselsource pollution often crosses the boundaries of national resource
jurisdiction.294
288. Id. at 40.
289. Moore, supra note 5, at 41.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 40-41. See U.S. Presents Proposals at PreparatorySession for
Law of the Sea Conference, 69 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 397, 410-11 (1973) (statement by
John Norton Moore, vice chairman of the United States delegation, made to the
Main Committee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction).
292. Id. at 41.
293. Id. at 40.
294. Id. at 41. Within the United States, there are important policy reasons
for supporting international uniformity in setting standards to govern vesselsource pollution. They include: (1) standard setting by a multiplicity of national
jurisdictions can result in unnecessary costs and sometimes contradictory requirements for ship design, construction, and operation; (2) diverse national jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution could be used to severely threaten navigational freedom on the world's oceans-a concern of vital importance to the
United States as a major maritime power; (3) ocean pollution knows no national
frontiers, and a focus on effective solutions requires an international forum; (4) a
single international body for the regulation of vessel-source pollution and safety
standards can respond more rapidly and cost-effectively to advances in knowledge and can build on a worldwide technological base; (5) a single international
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Naturally, the single body for setting international pollution
standards should be IMCO. Because the United States will probably not ratify the LOS Convention for several years, if ever, the
United States should preempt the vessel-source pollution standards of state and local governments. This federal preemption
should also be a part of any United States ratification of, or participation in, the Brussels Liability Convention or other international conventions sponsored by IMCO. In the interim, the Justice Department, the Transportation Department, and the
Department of State should all adopt the policy that state and
local attempts to control vessel-source pollution are unconstitutional exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 9 5
Two other recommendations merit consideration. First, the interface between resource jurisdiction and navigation reflected in
articles 55, 56, 58, 59 and 86 of ICNTRev.2,29 and retained in
the LOS Convention, is unacceptably vague. The drafters did not
intend that coastal states would have the right to interfere with,
or to control, navigation in their economic zones.2 97 The poor statutory language that exacerbates this problem should be
changed.28 Second, the rush to reach an agreement in UNCLOS
III resulted in the failure to satisfactorily resolve some issues by
clouding them in textual ambiguity.29 During the UNCLOS III
negotiations about ICNTIRev.2, it became apparent that UNCLOS III came close to reaching "a good agreement," and it was
"imperative that the needed time be taken to resolve remaining
problems." 30 0 Unfortunately, that advice went largely unheeded,
and the LOS Convention still retains unnecessary ambiguities in

body permits all affected nations to have a voice in any decision and, therefore,
is more democratic than regulating nonflag or nonport vessels in transit; and (6)
a single set of standards promotes competitive fairness in shipping and decreases the potential for uneconomic non-tariff barriers or selective disincentives
because of more lax or stringent national laws. Address by Professor John Norton Moore to the Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute, in Atlanta, Georgia
(June 19-20, 1981) (copy on file at Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University
of Virginia Law School).
295. See id.
296. ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 182, arts. 55, 56, 58, 59, 86.
297. Moore, supra note 5, at 41.

298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. The problems included assured access to deep seabed minerals, the
status of the "economic zone," article 65 on marine mammals, balanced delimitation of the continental margin, and marine scientific research. Id.
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defining the environmental rights and duties of flag states, coastal
states, and port states in regard to vessel-source pollution.

